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Original Latin American Constitutionalism
1. A tale of some origins
In 1811, the Articles of Confederation of the
United Provinces of New Granada, later called
Great Colombia (Nueva Granada or Gran Co-
lombia) set forth the transfer, from the Provinces
to the Union, of »the no-body lands« in con-
junction with »all the lands that may be con-
sidered nullius for being uninhabited« already
allotted to the Federation. The significance of
lands being barren and uninhabited is dubious
since the provision continues, »this shall cause
no dispossession, vexation or offence whatso-
ever to the wandering tribes or nations of un-
civilised Indians that are located or have settled
in those territories«. In the succeeding Article,
the precaution follows »we will be able to enter
into treaties and negotiations with them [the
Indians] over these objects, protecting their
rights with all the humanity and philosophy that
their current imbecility requires, and in consid-
eration of the ills already caused to them, with-
out any blame on ourselves, by a conquering
nation«. Such benevolence shall be maintained
»unless their hostility forces us into a different
course of action.«
Almost one month later, at the end of 1811,
also within the greater New Granada, Venezuela
sets up its own Confederation, but its Articles of
Confederation adopt a different approach to-
wards indigenous peoples. This constitutional
document does not require the Provinces to
transfer the territories with the annexed indige-
nous population, but, rather, to pursue a certain
policy in this regard so that »those citizens that
have been called Indians to date« may under-
stand »the close link they have with all the other
citizens«, overcome »the despondency and rus-
ticity to which the previous state of affairs has
subjected them«, assert »the rights they are
entitled to simply for being persons equal to all
those of the very humankind«, and proceed to
»distribute and title the lands that had been
granted to them and which are in their posses-
sion, so that the said lands are divided on a pro
rata basis among the family men of each town,
who can dispose of them as true owners.« Addi-
tionally, from now onwards, without needing to
wait for such integration into common citizen-
ship through the privatization of property, »the
laws that in the previous [colonial] Government
granted certain protective courts and privileges
of minors to the aforesaid naturals [Indians] are
hereby repealed.« Specifically, for »those previ-
ously called Indians«, it is forbidden »to provide
services against their will to coadjutors or priests
of their parish.«
Thus, the Constitution of Great Colombia
of 1821 ignores the presence of indigenous peo-
ples as such, as is again the case with the 1830
Constitution of Colombia, which now stood
alone. On the other hand, theoretically still with-
in the Great Colombian Confederation, Ecuador
contemplates Indians’ presence in its Constitu-
tion of 1830. Under the heading »Civil Rights
and Guarantees«, and as a final exception, the
Ecuadorian provision prescribes as follows:
»This Constituent Congress appoints the vener-
able parish priests as tutors and natural fathers
to the Indians, invigorating their ministry of
charity in favour of this innocent, abject and
miserable class.« Thus, what Venezuela tried to
constitutionally suppress in 1811, Ecuador en-
shrined in its Constitution of 1830.
25
Bartolomé Clavero
D
eb
at
te
2. Moral of the tale
There are more similarities than differences
in this clearly Latin American tale, and this is
true even between Venezuela and Ecuador. The
first point in common is the constitutional pre-
sumption of territorial dominion over independ-
ent peoples to the extent of denying them the
right to their own territory: barren, nullius,
uninhabited lands. States establish themselves
as if they had contiguous borders to one another
while, at the same time, they recognise the
existence of whole territories which in fact they
do not control or which they even plainly ignore,
and this is not deemed to undermine or impair
their title, each State’s title, to those territories.
There is another constitutional presumption
in common, one evidenced in adjectives such as
wandering, uncivilised, imbecilic, despondent,
rustic, minor, innocent, abject, or miserable.
Some of these adjectives were strict legal catego-
ries denoting a status or condition of degrada-
tion and subjection as long as the person were
culturally indigenous. The Venezuelan threshold
of common citizenship is in fact postponed. It
requires losing the condition of indigenousness,
which loss is mainly manifested through the
privatization of property and the implied dis-
appearance of the indigenous community. For
the moment, and for the whole tale, the suspen-
sion of all constitutional guarantees applies. Not
even a strict title to ownership is recognised:
lands that had been granted to them and which
are in their possession. And there is room for
wars of aggression in the event of resistance:
unless their hostility forces us into a different
course of action.
Considering all the elements in common, the
differences, albeit striking, are incidental. Even
though the possibility of entering into negotia-
tions with indigenous peoples by means of trea-
ties is laid down, so-called Indians are always
placed in a position of degradation and subjec-
tion to the power of the State in terms that do not
always turn out to be transitory. Apart from
that, we are witnessing a constitutional drive
that proclaims its intention to recognise rights
and the determination to provide guarantees by
establishing powers for the sake of non-indige-
nous people as well as of indigenous people who
had ceased to be Indian.1
3. Lesson learned
What kind of constitutionalism combines
the purpose of guaranteeing rights through
powers with the additional intention of subject-
ing, without any guarantee whatsoever, part of
the mankind it tries to reach, the indigenous part
which was the majority at the time? A category
of constitutionalism has already been coined to
identify it: colonial constitutionalism, the one
established to ensure settlers’ interests and sub-
sequent dominion through rights vested and
guaranteed to just this sector of the population
to start with. This category of colonial constitu-
tionalism has been so far applied to the Amer-
icas, not still to the whole of them but to the
United States and not taking into consideration
indigenous peoples in the American continent
but just the federal territories, i. e., territories
without constitutional autonomy currently over-
seas.2
In other regions, there has been a more
consistent use of the category colonial constitu-
tionalism, specifically in India, the Asian sub-
continent, where there is a research group, the
Calcutta Research Group, headed by Ranabir
Samaddar, which has turned the dependence on
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1 Bartolomé Clavero, Freedom’s
Law and Indigenous Rights: From
Europe’s Oeconomy to the Con-
stitutionalism of the Americas,
Berkeley 2005. Given the nature of
these pages, I hope the reader will
understand and forgive my being
self-referential and in addition ex-
pedient to conclude. The Spanish
original is available online: http://
clavero.derechosindigenas. org/
wp-content/uploads/2009/10/
1810-originalidad-constitucional.
pdf.
2 E. Robert Statham, Colonial
Constitutionalism: The Tyranny
of United States’ Offshore Terri-
torial Policy and Relations, Lan-
ham 2002; complete and confront
with Gary Lawson and Guy
Seidman, The Constitution of
Empire: Territorial Expansion and
American Legal History, New
Haven 2004.
British colonial constitutionalism into a key of
the constitutional history of independent India
itself. Thus, colonial constitutionalism is com-
posed of a set of devices that was and may still
be operational for the purposes of subjecting
part of the population to conditions of depend-
ence without due guarantees under a constitu-
tional system, a system characterized precisely
for providing them.3
Continuity between colonial times and con-
stitutional times with respect to the development
of constitutionalism itself is also becoming a key
issue for the United States. There it is understood
that colonialism lies in the relation between the
British metropolis and the British colonies and
not in the relation of the British people, in both
the metropolis and the colonies, with the in-
digenous peoples of the Americas. In this con-
text, the mordant of colonial constitutionalism is
completely lost.4
No attempt to apply the most integral con-
ception of the Calcutta Group in the Americas
has been made yet. Obviously, it cannot be made
just like that, even if for the fact that in the
Hispanic case there was no metropolitan con-
stitutionalism before the 1812 Cadiz Constitu-
tion that would extend to the colonial world.
Nevertheless, the colonies had an institutional
conglomerate of corporate pieces, jurisdictional
articulations and cultural strata that were not
effaced from the map because constitutionalism
came into place.5 And this colonial network is
the context where the constitutional Hispano-
American project on dominion over the indige-
nous people manifested in the Great Colombian
tale has been shaped and established.
Later on, for a certain time, Hispano-Amer-
ican Constitutions opted for discretion or silence
on the presence of indigenous peoples, overlap-
ping with the colonial constitutionalism that has
still not been completely discontinued. Constitu-
tional discretion or silence on indigenous peo-
ples is also a form of constitutional stricture.
At the beginning, candidness was the original
feature. At present, silence is over and loquac-
ity is again the norm. It serves as a reminder
of indigenous presence throughout constitution-
al history with a colonial background. In the
Americas, colonialism, in short, is an integral
element of constitutionalism, but an underhand
one.6
4. And lesson to be learned
Historiography, more than history itself, has
caused the colonial element to disappear from
constitutional mapping. The tale of Great Co-
lombia is the most explicit example to the con-
trary, but it is far from being the only one.7 It can
serve as a laboratory trial to make up for expe-
rience. It is not necessary to resort to other cases
to draw useful conclusions that do not prove
hasty.
Constitutional historiography, rather than
actual constitutional history, has built since in-
dependence a constitutionalism practically clon-
ed from that of Europe and, as a result, a society
substantially in line with its European counter-
part. In so doing, historiography severs not just
a member of the body allowing orthopaedics,
but a vital organ bringing about death, i. e., the
full fiction of a constitutional history, thus, all
summed up, impossible.8
The constant presence of indigenous peo-
ples throughout constitutional history, some of
them independent for a long time while others
still so to date, and others with autonomous
communities keeping their own institutions, is
not a forgotten element to be added now. This
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3 Ranabir Samaddar, The Mate-
riality of Politics, vol. I, The Tech-
nologies of Rule, London and
Delhi 2007, 19: »Colonial con-
stitutionalism was designed to
reinforce the material aspects of
colonial rule« and, for Samaddar,
even of constitutionalism in itself.
4 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Consti-
tuting Empire: New York and the
Transformation of Constitutional-
ism in the Atlantic World, 1664–
1830, Chapel Hill 2005.
5 Istor. Revista de Historia Interna-
cional 16 (2004): Historia y dere-
cho, historia del derecho, ed. by
Carlos Garriga.
6 Bartolomé Clavero, Geografía
Jurídica de América Latina: Pue-
blos Indígenas entre Constitucio-
nes Mestizas, México 2008.
7 Pronunciamientos indígenas de
las Constituciones americanas,
ed. by Bartolomé Clavero
(as of 2007), online: http://www.
alertanet.org; to date, also online:
http://clavero.derechosindigenas.
org.
8 Regarding the case of the United
States, Bartolomé Clavero,
Why American Constitutional
History is not Written, in: Qua-
derni Fiorentini per la Storia del
Pensiero Giuridico Moderno 36
(2007) 1445–1547.
presence necessitates an amendment to consti-
tutional historiography in depth and as a whole
if it intends to be true history and not a com-
placent mirror of the supremacist obstinacy of
non-indigenous people, the old colonial people,
in the Americas.
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